


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505



21 January 1976

Rear Admiral Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
Commandant
Armed Forces Staff College
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Dear Jerry:

Thanks for your letter of 13 January and I am most
pleased to accept your invitation to address the 59th
Class of the Armed Forces Staff College on Monday,
* 29 March 1976 at 10:00 A. M.

My office will be in touch with your Guest Speaker
Office to complete arrangements for the day's activities.

I, too, saw RMN and found him in good and improving
shape. Looking forward to see you,

Faithfully,



STAT

Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


* Note: Date changed
to 26 May - 1000 hrs.

VAW:me:21Jan76

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ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
7800 HAMPTON BOULEVARD • NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

76. 6221

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

13 JAN 1976

Dear General Walters:

The 59th Class of the Armed Forces Staff College will begin in February, and I sincerely hope that you will be able to join us to give another presentation on the National Intelligence Community. The subject of the lecture for this class will be "The Role of the Intelligence Community in Support of National Strategy." Your visit would be an outstanding contribution to our course of study.

We have tentatively scheduled your address for Monday, 29 March 1976, at 1000 hours. The normal procedure, you will recall, is for the lecture to last about 45 minutes, followed by a 15-minute break and a 45-minute question period. I hope that your schedule will permit you to remain for lunch with a few students and faculty members.

Your lecture topic is a key segment of our curriculum. In order to plan joint and combined operations, a joint staff officer must have a firm understanding of the role our intelligence community plays in the national security process. While the basic intelligence organization and functions are studied and taught throughout the course of instruction at AFSC, this particular lecture serves as the introduction and broad overview of United States intelligence resources. During this introduction, there are several areas that are most germane to the curriculum and of special interest to the student body. The students, in seminar, will receive instruction on the basic organization of the intelligence community, and on the statutory interrelationships among its various agencies. Of significant interest here are your personal views on this organization from an historical perspective of American intelligence efforts. The contribution of the intelligence community to the national policy-making process and its role in overseas operations would also be of interest. A broad discussion of collection capabilities and limitations would serve to complete the picture of U.S. intelligence at the national level.



While the school is capable of outlining the organizational framework and functions of the intelligence community to the student, your personal experience and insights will flesh-out this skeletal framework and allow the student to develop a greater understanding of the importance and contribution of the national intelligence effort.

As you know, we have a strict nonattribution policy, and you may be assured that your remarks will not be discussed outside the College. This permits a frank discussion of controversial issues and greatly enhances the learning experience of the student body.

My Guest Speaker Office (Phone: 804-444-5422) will complete the arrangements for your visit.

I look forward to welcoming you back to the College.

Very respectfully,



JEREMIAH A. DENTON, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Commandant

Atch.

1. Class Composition
2. Course Summary
3. Information Sheet - Mission
4. Information Sheet - Administrative

Just had 2 1/2 hours w/ RAN. He thinks you are absolutely tops - relays his regards.

59th CLASS COMPOSITION
AND SECURITY CLEARANCE INFORMATION

Class composition is as follows: Officers, both male and female, are in the grade of major/lieutenant colonel or lieutenant commander/commander. Civilians are of equivalent grade. Average age of the students is 36 years.

<u>U. S. military officers</u>	Women officers
82 Army	1
80 Air Force	1
62 Navy	
18 Marine Corps	
2 Coast Guard	
<u>244</u>	

Civilians

1	Defense Mapping Agency
1	Department of State
2	CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
1	DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
4	NSA - National Security Agency
1	DSA - Defense Supply Agency
2	Department of the Air Force
2	Department of the Army
1	Department of the Navy
<u>15</u>	

Allied Officers

2	Australia
2	Canada
1	France
6	United Kingdom
5	West Germany
<u>16</u>	

TOTAL 275

All students are cleared for access to Top Secret material -- the foreign students by their own governments. Although these allied officers are authorized access only to such U.S. classified information as has been approved for release by appropriate disclosure authorities in accordance with National Disclosure Policies, it is desirable that they participate in the course of instruction to the fullest extent practicable. They are excluded only when the application of the National Disclosure Policies would require such modifications in the presentation as to nullify its effectiveness for U.S. students.

COURSE SUMMARY

Course I Administration and Orientation: Contains the necessary background information for orderly conduct of the curriculum; it includes scheduled events such as lectures on College policies and procedures, special Allied student activities and ceremonies. There is an additional orientation program of 71 hours for the Allied students. Approximately 30 reserve officers join the student body during the 7th and 8th weeks of each class for a 70-hour program.

Course II U. S. Military Forces: It is designed to establish a fundamental understanding of the doctrine, organization, and capabilities of U. S. military forces as a prerequisite to the study of joint and combined topics. The focal point of Course II, the three Service Weeks, occur during the second, third, and fourth weeks of the schedule. Also included are field trips and the very essential series of lectures by the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Course III Defense Management: Focuses on the planning, programming, and budgeting processes practiced within the Department of Defense and the Service departments and on the problems of allocation of resources, choices among alternatives, and trade-offs. Additionally, an overview of management thought and theory, and how they impact on Defense Management, is included. The military decision-making process is examined with particular emphasis placed on: analysis techniques, automatic data processing, personnel resources, and managerial control methods. An exposure to creative thinking is provided to expand and stimulate thinking toward the formulation of innovative problem-solving techniques.

Course IV Organization and Command Relationships: Involves a study of the U. S. unified commands and the NATO military organization. In the associated lecture program, many of the CINC's present their personal views on the present unified command relationships and the functions of a joint staff. This course provides a brief but important basis for the studies conducted in Course V and VI.

Course V The U. S. Joint Planning Procedures: Is the core curriculum of the Armed Forces Staff College and encompasses a large portion of the scheduled hours. The phases of the Joint Planning Process are studied in the step by step development of a common scenario. Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) procedures and automated data processing systems are utilized throughout the course. The final block in Course V is an exercise in crisis management where the students demonstrate their newly acquired knowledge and skills in a real-world scenario. Development of self-expression skills and research techniques is stressed.

Course VI Environment and Strategy: Covers a wide-ranging spectrum of several blocks of instruction. Included are several lectures scheduled throughout the curriculum in the United States Environment and the International Environment blocks. The lectures familiarize the students with the broad national and international environment in which joint and combined forces operate. Major societal problems confronting contemporary leaders are explored by the students in seminar activity. A NATO exercise, supported by a guest lecture, examines some of the military, psychological, economic, political, and geographical problems of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Course VII Communicative Arts: Starts early in the curriculum and focuses on improving essential communications skills largely through individual efforts; continues throughout the academic period. The Research Program begins with a short introduction covering its objectives and options. Each student selects one of three options: An article for publication, an individual research report or group research; conducts orderly research and prepares a written product during research and unscheduled time. The Staff Study will also be addressed as a part of this program, but will not be a major research effort. The Staff Action Paper is the vehicle for the second writing program, which devotes 20 hours toward preparing typical "short-fuze" staff papers of several types. Selected students are required to brief their papers orally as they would in an actual action-officer role. Speaking skills are further refined through the presentation of oral book reports or leadership case studies in the 12-hour Professional Reading Program that focuses on individual professional reading. It includes a brief introductory seminar session aimed at encouraging and assisting students in the development of sound personal reading habits. Six scheduled periods are devoted to oral reviews to include student-led question/discussion periods.



MISSION

The Armed Forces Staff College was established on 13 August 1946 as a joint institution under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The mission of the College is to conduct a course of study in joint and combined organizations and operational planning, to include the supporting organizations and operations of the U.S. Military Services, and in related aspects of national and international security, in order to enhance the preparation of selected military officers for duty in joint and combined operations and planning in higher echelons of the Department of Defense and international military organizations.

THE CLASS AND SEMINAR INFORMATION

Two 5-month courses are presented each year, terminating in January and June. In addition to approximately 250 U.S. officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, the student body includes civilian representatives from several U.S. government agencies and normally allied officer students from Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. The average age of the students is 35 and they are either majors or lieutenant colonels, or the military or civilian grade equivalent.

The students are grouped into seminars for the conduct of certain major units of instruction by the conference method. It is the policy of the College to provide seminar membership in multiples of 3 (Army, Navy/Marine Corps, Air Force) with allied officers and civilian students apportioned equally to all seminars as numbers permit. The composition of the seminar is designed to assure maximum range of rank, experience, and Service specialization. However, the extent to which seminar representation can reflect Service specialization must be kept compatible with the degree of individual participation desired in seminar work and possible only in small discussion groups. It is an important facet of instruction that students share thinking in a personal way, that fellowship be cultivated, and that individual responsibility for the group's efficiency be stressed. To foster its academic principles most effectively and to derive maximum benefit from conference-type instruction, the College holds that the optimum number of students per seminar is no fewer than 12 and no more than 18.

Faculty officers, of different military Services, are detailed to each seminar as permanent advisers. The responsibility of the permanent faculty adviser is to provide guidance and assistance to his assigned students, and the relationship is necessarily a close one.

From time to time temporary seminars are formed by interchanging students among seminars. One faculty adviser is delegated responsibility for each temporary seminar for the purpose of conducting a single unit of instruction; upon completion of the unit another set of temporary seminars may be formed or the students may return to their permanent seminars. This procedure assists in accomplishing College objectives by giving students the opportunity to exchange ideas with the maximum number of other officers.

STUDENT SECURITY CLEARANCE

All U.S. students are cleared for Top Secret information; each allied student is cleared by his own government for information of a classification equivalent to U.S. Top Secret. Essentially the College respects the clearance afforded the students by their governments insofar as is permitted by U.S. security regulations contained in the National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (NDP-1).

THE GUEST SPEAKER PROGRAM

The guest speaker program is one of the most interesting and important features of the Staff College curriculum, for it provides the students with an opportunity to personally hear and question distinguished men and women whose contributions have made them leaders in their fields. Guest lecturers are encouraged to present their views in an environment of academic freedom, while students are urged to conduct responsible intellectual inquiry in the question and answer period.

Guest lectures usually support specific seminar instruction and are scheduled with the associated block of instruction; however, the Staff College also supports or participates in several special lecture series which complement the curriculum as a whole and are scheduled throughout the course. The General Delos C. Emmons series, which was inaugurated on 23 October 1969 to honor the first Commandant of the Staff College, highlights speakers of special eminence. The Art of Command Lectures, established in 1970 and also part of the Delos C. Emmons series, present the personal views of some of the most successful commanders of our time. Lectures of current interest are interspersed throughout the course, and annually the Staff College participates in the Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Program, a British-U.S. supported exchange lecture series.

AUDITORIUM PROCEDURES

All guest lectures are presented in the College auditorium in Normandy Hall. The auditorium seats approximately 700 persons, but audiences do not normally exceed 300. Attendance is limited to the faculty, staff, and student body of the College and to senior officers of the Armed Services from adjacent commands. The speaker's rostrum is equipped with a lapel microphone to permit freedom of movement on the platform. The public address system is regulated to conform to the speaker's voice for audibility throughout the auditorium.

It is customary for guest speakers to give a 45-minute address. After a short break, which affords the students an opportunity to formulate questions on the subject presented, there is a discussion period during which the speaker answers questions from the audience. A member of the faculty monitors this period; student assistants handle microphones, which are passed to prospective questioners in the audience. Students are encouraged to participate in accordance with their education, training, and experience. The speaker can expect them to be a receptive audience, asking timely and stimulating questions which may touch upon controversial aspects of the subject, delve further into it, or call for clarification of certain points raised by the speaker. Since the real value of the guest speaker program is the frank discussion of classified or controversial subjects by eminent speakers, the College safeguards this privilege of free expression. The auditorium is secure and intellectual freedom is a fact. The speaker can be assured that his words will carry no further than his audience.

No notes are taken, but the lectures and informal question periods are recorded; however, if the guest speaker requests, no recording will be made. A tape recording of the lecture can be provided the speaker, if required. Transcripts of guest lectures are not made available to agencies or persons outside the College.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION FOR VISITORS TO AFSC



TRANSPORTATION

Commercial

Norfolk Regional Airport, which is approximately 30 minutes from the Staff College, is served by four commercial airlines: United, National, Piedmont, and Allegheny.

Military

Norfolk NAS (Chambers Field)

Located 15 minutes from the Staff College by automobile. Norfolk NAS is the most convenient arrival point. Aircraft will be directed to taxi to Base Operations where the AFSC escort officer will meet the guest speaker and accompany him to the Staff College.

Langley AFB (Hampton, Virginia)

Langley AFB is approximately 30 minutes from the Staff College by automobile.

Oceana NAS (Soucek Field)

Located in Virginia Beach, Oceana is approximately 35 minutes from AFSC by automobile.

ESCORT


Upon arrival in Norfolk, guest speakers are met by a member of the faculty who will provide any assistance, including storage of classified material. The speaker should inform the Guest Speaker Office of his method of travel and time and place of arrival as soon as practicable.

QUARTERS AND MEALS

There are a few military facilities which can accommodate families should the guest or a member of his party be accompanied. Additionally, there are many motels in the area, and the AFSC Guest Speaker Office will be happy to make all quarters arrangements for the speaker and his party.

The Norfolk area boasts a number of fine restaurants and, with the many military installations, offers a number of officers' clubs with excellent dining facilities.

MAP OF LOCAL AREA



IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Armed Forces Staff College Dispensary

dial 444-5052

(After duty hours a duty corpsman is on duty and can contact the On-call Medical Officer.)

Autovon

To make Autovon calls dial 444-7861 (Naval Communications Center) and give the Autovon number to the operator.

The AFSC Autovon number is 690 plus the extension (i.e., 690-5302).

AFSC Duty Officer - 444-5132

Guest Speaker Office - 444-5422/5109

Motor Pool

duty hours - 444-5529

non duty hours - 444-5542

AFSC BOQ

Desk - 444-5311

~~SECRET~~

21 MAY 1976

DDCI ADDRESS FOR
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
26 MAY 1976

THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

ADMIRAL DENTON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TALK THIS MORNING ABOUT HOW
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTES TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS. I WILL ALSO COMMENT
ON THE SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL CHANGES NOW UNDER WAY.

LET US UNDERSTAND, AT THE OUTSET, THAT INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICERS DO NOT MAKE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS;
INSTEAD, THEY TRY TO PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE INFORMA-
TION AND JUDGMENTS TO THOSE WHO ARE GOING TO MAKE THE
DECISIONS. *ISAG STORY*

INTELLIGENCE AND THE POLICY MAKER

OUR POLICY MAKERS -- THE PRESIDENT AND THE MEMBERS
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- ARE FREQUENTLY
CALLED UPON TO MAKE GRAVE DECISIONS REGARDING THE IN-
TERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AS THEY ARE AFFECTED BY

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SECRET

EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. YOU CAN IMAGINE THAT THEY COULD MAKE THESE DECISIONS IN SEVERAL WAYS -- IN IGNORANCE, ON HUNCHES, OR IN THE LIGHT OF THE BEST JUDGMENTS TRAINED PROFESSIONALS CAN BRING TO BEAR UPON THE PARTICULAR SITUATION. OBVIOUSLY, THE LAST ALTERNATIVE IS HIGHLY PREFERABLE. THIS IS WHERE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMES INTO THE PICTURE. OUR JOB IS TO PROVIDE THE AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION AND JUDGMENTS ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON ABROAD TO THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.

ILLEGIB

INTELLIGENCE IS NOT MERE INFORMATION, OR RAW FACTS, ALTHOUGH THESE ARE OF COURSE THE FIRST NECESSARY INGREDIENT. BUT THE SOURCES OF THE INFORMATION MUST BE EVALUATED, THEIR REPORTS AND ALLEGED "FACTS" ANALYZED, FITTED IN WITH OTHER FACTS, AND FILTERED THROUGH THE MINDS OF THE BEST EXPERTS POSSIBLE BEFORE THEY BECOME INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A LENGTHY PROCESS; ~~SOME INFORMATION HAS TO BE ANALYZED BY PHOTO-INTERPRETERS, POLITICAL EXPERTS, ECONOMISTS, AND -- AS ALWAYS IN ANY BUREAUCRACY -- THEIR CONCLUSIONS HAVE TO BE REVIEWED BY OFFICE CHIEFS AND EVEN HIGHER SACHEMS. INEVITABLY, SOME OF THESE PEOPLE ARE SICK, ON LEAVE, OR JUST PLAIN OUT TO LUNCH.~~ BUT WHEN THE CHIPS ARE REALLY DOWN,

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~THE COMMUNITY SEEMS TO RALLY AROUND, AND~~ THE ANALYSIS
~~DOES~~ GET DONE QUICKLY ENOUGH TO BE OF USE TO THE POLICY
MAKERS.

How Collect - overt, Tech, Cland

THERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT DISTINCTION. INTEL-
LIGENCE, IF IT IS TO SERVE THE HIGHEST POLICY MAKERS,
MUST BE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE -- THAT IS, THE SYNTHESIS
OF ALL INFORMATION KNOWN TO ALL DEPARTMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, AND THE BEST JUDGMENTS OF ALL KNOWLEDGEABLE
OFFICIALS -- NOT THE PAROCHIAL VIEWS OF ANY SINGLE
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT. I'M SURE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN
REMINDING THAT THE PEARL HARBOR EXPERIENCE SHOWED THE
NECESSITY FOR THIS KIND OF INTELLIGENCE ALMOST AS
MANY TIMES AS YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT INTELLIGENCE
IS THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION. THE POINT IS NEVER-
THELESS A CRUCIAL ONE. THE VARIOUS SERVICES HAD PLENTY
OF FACTS POINTING TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF A JAPANESE AT-
TACK -- BUT NO ONE WAS MAKING IT HIS BUSINESS TO BREAK
THROUGH THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL BARRIERS, TO PUT ALL
THESE FACTS TOGETHER, AND COMMUNICATE THEM TO THE
PRESIDENT CLEARLY, SUCCINCTLY, AND QUICKLY. "THE WAR,"
SAID PRESIDENT TRUMAN LATER, "TAUGHT US THIS LESSON --
THAT WE HAD TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE IN A MANNER THAT
WOULD MAKE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE WHERE IT WAS
NEEDED, IN AN INTELLIGIBLE AND UNDERSTANDABLE FORM."

ILLEGIB



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CERTAINLY PLAYED -- AND IS CONTINUING TO PLAY -- AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AND AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. COULD YOU CONCEIVE OF THE PRESIDENT NEGOTIATING ABOUT ARMS LIMITATIONS UNLESS HE HAS PRETTY SOUND ANSWERS TO THE 64 DOLLAR QUESTION OF LIMITATION FROM WHAT? IN OTHER WORDS, HE HAS TO KNOW WHAT STRATEGIC WEAPONS THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE, WHAT NEW WEAPONS ARE ACTUALLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT, AND WHAT STILL MORE ADVANCED ONES MIGHT BE ON SOVIET DRAWING BOARDS AND SOVIET MINDS -- AND WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES TO PRODUCE. AT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS THE RUSSIAN DELEGATES HAVE GAPED IN AMAZEMENT AT WHAT THEY ADMIT ARE OUR EXTREMELY ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPONS.

WE HAVE, HOWEVER, DEVELOPED TECHNIQUES FOR MAINTAINING COVERAGE
GLEANNING INFORMATION FROM THE RUSSIANS' CLOSED SOCIETY NATURALLY POSES A CONSTANT CHALLENGE. *PHOTO 1 Kremlin*

BEYOND THAT, THE RUSSIANS GO TO SOME LENGTHS TO CONCEAL WHAT MIGHT BE OBSERVED BY PHOTOGRAPHY OR TO DECEIVE. SOMETIMES THEY TRY TO THROW OFF OUR UNIT COUNT BY BUILDING BOGUS EQUIPMENT. THEY SOMETIMES SLIP, HOWEVER,



25X1

PHOTO 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST ADVISE THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION WOULD CREATE MONITORING PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, SOME TYPES OF AGREEMENTS WOULD BE EASIER TO MONITOR THAN OTHERS.

25X1

IN VIEW OF THESE

VARYING CAPABILITIES, THE DCI WOULD HAVE TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT AS TO FORMULATIONS AND PROVISIONS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AN AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO BE SURE WE COULD MONITOR IT.

ONCE AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS NEED TO KNOW IF THE SOVIET UNION IS LIVING UP TO THE TERMS. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CAN AND DOES MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND THE

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~~SECRET~~

INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH CONFIDENCE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS WOULD BE DETECTED. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMS THE PRESIDENT OF ANY ACTIVITY OR AMBIGUOUS SITUATION THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS NON-COMPLIANCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POLICY MAKERS TAKE IT FROM THERE, AND DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE SITUATION THAT INTELLIGENCE HAS UNCOVERED.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT DOES NOT STOP WITH THE MILITARY AND SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO SALT. SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EVEN TRY TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS MUST BE VIEWED IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. HERE THE QUESTIONS THAT INTELLIGENCE MUST ANSWER ARE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC. HOW FIRMLY COMMITTED IS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO WHAT HAS BEEN KNOWN AS "DETENTE?" COULD INTERNAL POLITICAL STRESSES, CAUSED BY LAST YEAR'S DISASTROUS HARVEST OR THE INEVITABLE SUCCESSION PROBLEM, CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO LOSE ENTHUSIASM FOR, OR EVEN ABANDON IT? IT IS NO SECRET THAT THE RUSSIANS' NEED TO CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST STEERED THEM TOWARD "DETENTE." BUT JUST HOW PRESSING ARE THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS? HOW ARE THEY TRYING TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS, AND WHAT ARE THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS?

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~~SECRET~~

WHEN ASKED HOW HIS POTATOES CAME OUT LAST YEAR, A FARMER REPLIED THAT THEY DIDN'T COME OUT -- HE HAD TO DIG 'EM OUT. LIKEWISE WITH THE ANSWERS TO ALL THESE MILITARY, SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. THEY HAVE TO BE DUG OUT OF MASSES OF RAW INFORMATION, COLLECTED BY VARIOUS AGENCIES AND BY MANY DIFFERENT MEANS. THIS INFORMATION BECOMES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ONLY AFTER IT HAS BEEN CAREFULLY ANALYZED AND COORDINATED, IN A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EFFORT BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

INTELLIGENCE MUST PRODUCE OVER A BROAD RANGE OF QUESTIONS. SOME ARE RIGHT-NOW QUESTIONS, SUCH AS WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE SENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE MIDDLE EAST. OTHERS ARE GENERAL AND COMPLEX, SUCH AS THE LONG-RUN OUTLOOK FOR [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] AS IT PRODUCES ACROSS THIS RANGE, HOW DOES INTELLIGENCE COMPARE WITH, AND DIFFER FROM, THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO A REGULAR READER OF THE COMMERCIAL AND SCHOLARLY PRESS?

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT RESTS ON ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES. WHILE THE FINAL PRODUCT MAY NOT ALWAYS CARRY AN EXOTIC CLASSIFICATION, THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST HAS TAKEN PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM ALL THE SPECIAL SOURCES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING HIS CONCLUSIONS. SOMETIMES THIS DOES NO MORE THAN SAVE HIM FROM AN ERROR INTO WHICH A JOURNALIST WOULD EASILY FALL; SOMETIMES IT LEADS HIM TO CONCLUSIONS WHICH A JOURNALIST COULD NOT REACH.

25X1

IN THE SECOND PLACE, BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL SOURCES, INTELLIGENCE CAN INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS INACCESSIBLE TO OUTSIDE EXPERTS. OUR VIEWS ON THE LIKELY POLICIES OF A NEW FRENCH PREMIER MAY BE NO BETTER THAN THAT OF AN EXPERIENCED PARIS-BASED NEWSPAPERMAN

25X1

THUS IT IS IN THE MILITARY, SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNICAL FIELDS THAT INTELLIGENCE MAKES ITS UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION.

IN THE THIRD PLACE, INTELLIGENCE IS RESPONSIBLE. IT DOES NOT HAVE TO COMPETE WITH HEADLINES ABOUT HOWARD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

HUGHES' WILL, OR MILLION-DOLLAR TV CONTRACTS. NOR DOES IT, IN A FACELESS SORT OF WAY, MERELY LIST OUT ALL THE "REPORTS" AND THE "FACTS." INSTEAD, IT DRAWS CAREFUL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN WHAT IS KNOWN FOR SURE, WHAT IS ALMOST CERTAINLY TRUE, WHAT IT JUDGES TO BE PROBABLY TRUE, WHAT IS POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY. IT TELLS ITS READERS WHICH OF ITS ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS ARE FIRMLY BASED AND WHICH ARE SIMPLY THE BEST GUESSES OF EXPERIENCED ANALYSTS CONFRONTED WITH FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION ON A COMPLEX PROBLEM. SINCE IT IS ONE OF THE BASES FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, IT CANNOT BE MERELY SENSATIONAL; IT MUST BE SERIOUS.

IN THE FOURTH PLACE, INTELLIGENCE IS RESPONSIVE. IT IS A SERVICE WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT AND CAN BE DIRECTED TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH POLICY MAKERS SPECIFY, WHETHER THESE ARE OBVIOUS FRONT-PAGE MATERIAL IN THE OPEN PRESS OR DEEPLY HIDDEN QUESTIONS.

BEFORE INTELLIGENCE CAN BE OF USE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS, IT MUST REACH THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND OTHER TOP POLICY MAKERS.

PART OF THIS CHALLENGE IS A DAILY, OR EVEN HOURLY MATTER -- TO BE USEFUL THE INTELLIGENCE MUST BE CURRENT. IN ORDER TO KEEP THE TOP OFFICIALS UP TO DATE ON MAJOR

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

FAST-BREAKING STORIES -- LIKE THE LATEST SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS INTO SYRIA AND THE NEW THAI GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD RETAINING ANY US FACILITIES -- WE PRESENT THE TOP OF THE DAILY INTELLIGENCE TAKE IN AN ATTRACTIVE, NEWSPAPER FORMAT. DEEPER ANALYTICAL ARTICLES ALSO APPEAR, UNDER THE AUTHOR'S BY-LINE. SORRY, THERE'S NO ROOM FOR "STEVE CANYON."

ON MATTERS OF HIGHEST IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE, THERE ARE TWO MECHANISMS. ONE, THE VITAL AREA OF POSSIBLE SOVIET OR OTHER COMMUNIST AGGRESSIVE INTENT, IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DCI'S STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF. LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON, THE STAFF IS SUPPORTED AND MANNED BY THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. VIRTUALLY INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS COME FROM ALL POINTS THAT MIGHT FORETELL HOSTILE ACTIONS. THE STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF HAS NO OTHER JOB. KEY ELEMENTS IN THE WHOLE COMMUNITY ALSO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THIS MOST CRITICAL CONCERN. FOR OTHER SITUATIONS THAT MIGHT SUDDENLY DEMAND A MAJOR HIGH-LEVEL POLICY DECISION, LIKE, SAY, A POSSIBLE COUP IN ITALY, THE DCI ISSUES AN ALERT MEMORANDUM OUTLINING THE PROBLEM SUCCINCTLY.

ANOTHER ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL WAYS IN WHICH WE REACH THE TOP POLICY MAKERS IS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

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ESTIMATE. MANY ESTIMATES COVER FAIRLY STANDARD TOPICS, SUCH AS THE OUTLOOK FOR ARGENTINA OR PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THEY TAKE OFF FROM THE COMMUNITY'S PRESENT KNOWLEDGE, AND TRY TO PREDICT BROAD TRENDS OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS. OTHERS ARE MORE SPECIALIZED PAPERS SUCH AS THOSE ON THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THEY MAY INVOLVE SUCH POINTS AS THE EXACT EQUIPMENT ON SOVIET REGIMENTS. THIS PHOTOGRAPH OF A MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION SHOWS ENOUGH DETAIL TO HELP WITH THAT. (PHOTO: Motorized Rifle Division) OR THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER, THE KIEV. (PHOTO) THESE ESTIMATES ARE BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF EVIDENCE; THEY GO INTO GREATER DETAIL AND GENERALLY LOOK AHEAD FOR PERIODS OF FIVE YEARS OR SO. THE PRINCIPAL ONES FOCUS ON THE USSR'S STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES, AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. WE TIME THE ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF THESE ESTIMATES TO ASSIST IN THE PLANNING OF DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS.

PHOTO 3

PHOTO 4

IN ORDER TO BE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ESTIMATES MUST REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND RECORD -- ACCURATELY AND FULLY -- ANY MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OR JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE

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COMMUNITY. ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTE FACTS, ANALYSES, AND JUDGMENTS IN OFTENTIMES STORMY DRAFTING SESSIONS, AND DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS VIGOROUSLY WHEN THE ESTIMATE GOES BEFORE THE TOP INTELLIGENCE BOARD. THERE HAVE BEEN HEATED WORDS EXCHANGED ABOUT WILL OR WON'T THE SOVIETS USE THEIR NEW BACKFIRE BOMBER FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK. (PHOTO: Backfire)

PHOTO
5

WE ALSO WORK THROUGH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPARATUS, AND THE STUDIES OF POLICY QUESTIONS CALLED FOR IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDA -- COMMONLY CALLED NSSMs. MORE THAN 200 OF THESE NSSMs HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED. THEY HAVE SET IN MOTION STUDIES RANGING FROM HIGHLY SPECIFIC PROJECTS SUCH AS US OCEAN POLICY, OR US POLICY TOWARD GREECE, TO SMALL ENCYCLOPEDIAS ABOUT CHOICES FOR THE US STRATEGIC POSTURES. THE COMMUNITY SUPPLIES THE FACTS AND THE INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE POLICY OPTIONS WHICH A NSSM PRESENTS TO THE PRESIDENT, AND BY SO DOING CARRIES OUT ITS ADVISORY AND POLICY SUPPORT ROLE AT A HIGH LEVEL.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ALSO PARTICIPATES IN THE MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPARATUS. THE SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, FOR INSTANCE, REVIEWS NSSM STUDIES, AND IN CRISIS SITUATIONS THE WASH-

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INGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP -- A SORT OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM -- MEETS TO COORDINATE TIMELY ACTIONS. THE DIRECTOR OFTEN BEGINS THESE MEETINGS WITH A BRIEFING OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND OF THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE ALSO BRIEFS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF ISSUES WHICH COME BEFORE IT.

BENEATH THIS EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE DCI AND SENIOR POLICY MAKERS, THERE IS A FLOW OF INFORMATION AT LOWER LEVELS. ~~SOMETIMES THIS SOUNDS LIKE ONE ANALYST COOING-
TO ANOTHER.~~ BUT ACTUALLY ^{THIS} ~~IT~~ SHARPENS JUDGMENTS AND CREATES A RESERVOIR OF INTELLIGENCE. ANALYSTS WHO HAVE BEEN POOLING THEIR RESEARCH ON SOVIET AGRICULTURE OR GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES COME OUT OF THE WOODWORK WHEN WORLD EVENTS TAKE SUDDEN NEW DIRECTIONS, AND WE ARE GLAD TO HAVE THEM.

THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

THIS, THEN, IS WHAT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS AND HOW IT CONTRIBUTES TO NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING. THE NEXT QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS HOW DOES IT GET PRODUCED? OBVIOUSLY NOT BY CHANCE -- BUT BY THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE WHICH HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SINCE THIS IS A TERM MUCH DISCUSSED TODAY, AND WAS THE SUBJECT OF TWO SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL IN-

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VESTIGATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY REMARKS TO EXPLAINING WHAT IT IS, WHERE IT CAME FROM, AND WHERE IT MAY BE GOING.

LIKE FAUST TRYING TO TRANSLATE THE BIBLE, WE CAN EASILY GET BOGGED DOWN ON THE FIRST WORDS. THE VERY TERM "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" IS AT ONCE ELUSIVE, MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE, AND IS A FERTILE SOURCE OF CONFUSION. IN THE VERY BROADEST SENSE, IT REFERS TO THOSE COMPONENTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, THE PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE, THE PROVISION OF VARIOUS KINDS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, COVERT ACTION), AND SOME MEASURE OF SUPPORT (LARGELY IN THE SUBSTANTIVE FIELD) TO THE CONGRESS.

MORE BROADLY, IN THE BEST SENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE US GOVERNMENT FORM A COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS, OR CERTAINLY OF HIGHLY TRAINED EXPERTS. BUT WE ARE NOT A COMMUNE. EACH MEMBER HAS HIS OWN SUPERIOR, TO WHOM HE MUST REPORT AND WHOSE NEEDS HE MUST MEET -- THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND IN CIA'S CASE, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. BUT THE SYSTEM DOES WORK, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE ANIMATED BY A SENSE OF

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OPERATING TOGETHER ON COMMON PROBLEMS, AND BY A FEELING THAT, IF ONE OF US FAILS, NONE OF US CAN REALLY SUCCEED.

THE ORIGINS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

AS A CONCEPT, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GOES BACK TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. THE ACT HAS BEEN FLESHED OUT BY A NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS -- AND TODAY IS ON THE VERGE OF ITS FIRST MAJOR OVERHAUL. MORE ON THAT LATER. FIRST, LET'S LOOK AT THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY AS IT IS NOW.

BY PRESIDENTIAL ORDER, THE DCI IS THE GOVERNMENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. HE ACTS AS THE PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND AS COORDINATOR OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS MAKES HIM THE HEAD OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

IT MIGHT AT FIRST SEEM THAT ONE COULD DESCRIBE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SIMPLY BY LISTING OUT ITS VARIOUS MEMBERS. AS DEFINED IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER OF ~~1976~~ ¹⁹⁷⁶ FEBRUARY, THEY ARE THOSE SHOWN ON THIS CHART.

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THERE ARE, HOWEVER, MANY CONSIDERATIONS THAT CUT ACROSS THIS SIMPLE ROLL-CALL. SOME MIGHT LIKEN IT TO A COUNTRY CLUB -- FOUNDING MEMBERS, SOCIAL MEMBERS,

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AND HONORARY MEMBERS. THERE ARE MANY SHADINGS.

THUS WE CAN NOTE THAT THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCING ORGANIZATIONS ARE CIA, THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DIA, AND THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES -- BUT BEYOND THIS SINGLE STATEMENT IS A VERITABLE SWAMP OF QUALIFICATIONS.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A MAJOR COLLECTOR AND PROCESSOR OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HAS AN ASSOCIATED ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY. BUT THIS CAPABILITY IS NOT APPLIED TO AN "ALL-SOURCE" ENVIRONMENT, SINCE NSA IS PRIMARILY KEYED TO COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

THE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (FORMERLY PART OF AEC) IS UNIQUE IN A DIFFERENT WAY. ERDA NEITHER COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE NOR DOES ANY SIGNIFICANT ANALYSIS. IT OWES ITS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP TO THE FACT THAT IT REPRESENTS A UNIQUE AND EXCLUSIVE BODY OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION, AND TO THE LANGUAGE OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946.

THE FBI IS CONSIDERED A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY, BECAUSE OF ITS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, AND (TO A LESSER EXTENT) LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

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IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY FIELD. THE FBI DOES NOT PERFORM ANY SUBSTANTIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, NOR DOES IT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN COLLECTING POSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

THOUGH TREASURY IS DESIGNATED A COMMUNITY MEMBER, MANY STILL CONSIDER IT PRIMARILY A CONSUMER OF INTELLIGENCE. HOWEVER, THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AS KEY INGREDIENTS OF MANY MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS IS MAKING TREASURY'S ROLE LOOM LARGER EVERY DAY.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADDS A FEW MORE COMPLEXITIES TO OUR PROBLEM. ITS SMALL BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH IS ENGAGED LARGELY IN ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION. ALSO WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT IS THE FOREIGN SERVICE. THE COMMUNITY REGARDS THE FOREIGN SERVICE AS A PRIME COLLECTOR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION. ~~[BUT BE PREPARED FOR THE WORST THE NEXT TIME YOU TELL A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF THE "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY." HE WON'T BE SMILING]~~

DEFINING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION COMMUNITY HAS POSED SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE PAST. A REALIGNMENT ORDERED EARLIER THIS MONTH PROMISES TO RESOLVE MANY OF THESE. I WILL OUTLINE THEM LATER.

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ARE YOU BEGINNING TO SEE WHY IT IS NOT EASY TO PIN DOWN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY? IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST FOUR "COMMUNITIES" WITH INTELLIGENCE-RELATED RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERESTS, ALL OF WHICH INTERLOCK AND OVERLAP. THESE INCLUDE:

THE COLLECTORS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND PROVIDERS OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THIS COMMUNITY WOULD OF COURSE INCLUDE CIA'S DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS, PLUS THE CIA OFFICE OF ELINT AND STAT TIONS, PLUS THE CIA OFFICE OF ELINT AND NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, NSA, AND THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. STATE'S FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS, TREASURY, AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE ATTACHES, AND THE MILITARY SERVICE ATTACHES WOULD ALSO BE PART OF THIS COMMUNITY, ALONG WITH THE COLLECTING ELEMENTS OF DIA, THE SERVICES, AND THE FBI.

STAT

THE ANALYSTS AND PRODUCERS OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS ANOTHER COMMUNITY. THESE PEOPLE ARE FOUND IN CIA'S DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND CERTAIN PARTS OF ITS DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS WELL AS IN DIA AND THE THREE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS, NSA (SOMETIMES, IN SOME FIELDS), STATE/INR, AND OCCASIONALLY ERDA AND THE TREASURY MUST ALSO BE INCLUDED.

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THEN THERE ARE THE RESOURCE MANAGERS. HERE THE NEW COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE HAS RESPONSIBILITY. I WILL RETURN TO THIS GROUP SHORTLY.

FINALLY, THERE ARE THE CONSUMERS. THE CONSUMER COMMUNITY IS ITSELF COMPLEX, AND INCLUDES MANY PEOPLE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THE PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE NSC, AND THEIR SENIOR STAFF AND SUBORDINATES HEAD THE LIST, BUT THE SECRETARIES OF THE TREASURY, COMMERCE, AND AGRICULTURE AND THEIR SENIOR STAFFS AND SUBORDINATES ALSO FIGURE IN. THE ECONOMIC POLICY COMMUNITY -- SUCH AS THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK -- ALSO FORMS PART OF THIS CONSUMER COMMUNITY.

WELL -- SURELY I HAVE SAID ENOUGH TO CONVINCE YOU THAT THE TERM "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" IS AN AMORPHOUS ONE.

WHAT WE CAN SEE IS THAT TIME, THE INCREASINGLY COMPLEX NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE ITSELF, AND A CHANGING CLIMATE OF PUBLIC OPINION HAVE MADE THE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT EITHER OBSOLETE OR TOO WEAK A FOUNDATION FOR THE SYSTEM THAT HAS EVOLVED -- OR GROWN LIKE TOPSY -- OVER THE 29 YEARS.

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IN 1947 CONGRESS THOUGHT IT WAS CREATING A SMALL INDEPENDENT AGENCY, NOT SUBORDINATE TO ANY CABINET DEPARTMENT, TO "CORRELATE AND EVALUATE" THE PRODUCT OF THE EXISTING, LARGELY MILITARY, AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. THE CONGRESS PLACED ON THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES THOUGHT TO BE MODEST, AND PROVIDED HIM WITH WHAT IT CONSIDERED COMMENSURATE AUTHORITIES. AFTER ALMOST THREE DECADES, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ENORMOUS, WHILE THE AUTHORITIES WERE LESS THAN ADEQUATE. HAVING JUST A LITTLE AUTHORITY WAS AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION -- LIKE BEING JUST A LITTLE PREGNANT.

THOSE WHO DRAFTED AND ENACTED THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR COULD HAVE FORESEEN:

-- THAT BY 1976 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WOULD BECOME A MAJOR PART OF GOVERNMENT, LARGER IN THE PEACE OF 1976 THAN IN THE WAR OF 1945.

-- THAT THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE WOULD EXPAND TO COVER DIPLOMACY, COMMERCE, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS WORLDWIDE, AS WELL AS THE MORE TRADITIONAL MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

-- THAT THE EXTRACTION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM CLOSED SOCIETIES CAPABLE OF THREATENING MAJOR US

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INTERESTS, OR EVEN SURVIVAL, WOULD REQUIRE THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE, COMPLEX, AND EXPENSIVE COLLECTION SYSTEMS; AND THAT EFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT OF THESE SYSTEMS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST WOULD REQUIRE CENTRAL, UNIFIED MANAGEMENT.

-- THAT THE ACT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR RESOLUTION OF IMPORTANT MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL PROBLEMS, PRIMARILY INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INHERENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE MAJOR SYSTEMS.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAD RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY AS MUCH IN PRODUCTION AS IN MANAGEMENT. THE OLD USIB PRODUCTION MACHINERY WORKED, BUT IT DID SO IN PART BECAUSE THE PARTICIPATING AGENCIES KNOW THEY NEED NOT HAVE BEEN INHIBITED BY IT WHEN THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE. A DCI WHO INDEPENDENTLY HAD ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT COULD EXTRACT A SERIOUS PRODUCT FROM USIB, AND COULD PERSONALLY ENSURE THAT THE PRODUCT WOULD BE READ BY THE RIGHT PEOPLE. BUT SIMPLY BEING NAMED DCI DID NOT GIVE HIM THIS STANDING.

THE FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESS OF THE DCI'S STATUTORY POSITION SHOWED UP ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF HIS PRODUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT MOST SERIOUSLY IN HIS INABILITY TO ESTABLISH THE PRIMACY OF NATIONAL PRODUCTS OVER DEPARTMENTAL ONES. ~~THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THE ACT ALSO~~

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~~AUTHORIZED THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES TO CONTINUE TO PRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. THIS CREATED A MORASS IN WHICH THE DCI IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE AS MEMBERS OF THE NSC, BUT INR AND DIA COULD STILL FUNNEL INTELLIGENCE TO THESE SECRETARIES AS THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENT HEADS. THIS PROVIDED THE DEPARTMENTS AND THE SERVICES A CHANNEL FOR DISSEMINATION OF THEIR PRODUCT TO THE WHITE HOUSE. MOREOVER, WHILE BOTH AGENCIES INSIST THAT CIA'S NATIONAL PRODUCT BE COORDINATED WITH THEM AND EXERCISE VIGOROUSLY -- AS THEY SHOULD -- THE RIGHT TO DISSENT, NEITHER HAS HESITATED TO ISSUE UNCOORDINATED VIEWS, SOME OF WHICH MAY CONFLICT WITH A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE POSITION.]~~

AT LEAST EQUALLY AMBIGUOUS WAS THE DCI'S RESPONSIBILITY IN REGARD TO MANAGEMENT OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY -- NOTABLY THE BUDGET. TO PUT IT SIMPLY, HE WAS CHARGED WITH MANAGING AND COORDINATING, BUT ONE ELEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, HAD MOST OF THE MUSCLE -- THAT IS, ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET. THE DCI COULD ADVISE ON THIS, AND DID, BUT ULTIMATE DECISIONS ON CUTTING DOWN OR ADDING INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES RESTED ELSEWHERE.

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CHANGES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

THESE PROBLEMS RECEIVED GROWING ATTENTION BOTH IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND ON CAPITOL HILL, EVEN AS PUBLIC ATTENTION FOCUSED ON MORE SENSATIONAL MATTERS. THE EXECUTIVE WAS FIRST TO ACT. ON FEBRUARY 18, ¹⁹⁷⁶ PRESIDENT FORD TOOK THE INITIATIVE BOTH TO STRENGTHEN UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT, AND TO DEAL WITH SOME PAST ABUSES THAT HAD BEEN IN THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT.

HE ISSUED AN OMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING POLICY GUIDELINES AND RESTRICTIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, AND A NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE AND OVERSIGHT MECHANISM FOR THE COMMUNITY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE PROPOSED NEW LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE SECRECY OF PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, AND MET WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TO DEVELOP LEGISLATION CONCERNING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED OPENING OF MAIL. THE PRESIDENT ALSO ENDORSED LEGISLATION TO PROHIBIT ASSASSINATIONS OF FOREIGN LEADERS, AND PROPOSED A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH CONSTRUCTIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COULD BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DISCLOSING INTELLIGENCE SECRETS.

THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES STRENGTHENS ITS CAPABILITY TO GATHER AND EVALUATE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND CONDUCT

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NECESSARY COVERT OPERATIONS ON THE ONE HAND, AND THAT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED IN A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LAWFUL MANNER AND NEVER AIMED AT OUR OWN CITIZENS, ON THE OTHER.

HOW WILL THIS BE DONE? FIRST OF ALL, THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS SET FORTH ~~CLEAR~~ POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WHICH DEFINES BOTH WHAT THEY ARE EXPECTED TO DO AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO DO.

*This
Verifies*

SECOND, THE ACTIONS CREATE A STREAMLINED COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE COMMUNITY WHICH MAKES SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNTABLE. THIRD, IN THE AREA OF OVERSIGHT, THEY REQUIRE THE NSC TO CONDUCT SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEWS OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT, AND ESTABLISH A NEW MECHANISM, THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD, TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE COMMUNITY'S ACTIVITIES.

OVERALL POLICY DEVELOPMENT

I WOULD LIKE TO SPELL OUT SOME OF THE CHANGES.

AT THE TOP OF THE PYRAMID, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES TO EXERCISE OVERALL POLICY CONTROL OVER THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (CHART) THE NSC'S SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEW, ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, IS TO BE FOCUSED ON THREE TOPICS:

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- THE NEEDS OF POLICYMAKERS, AND THE RESPON-
SIVENESS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TO THESE NEEDS;
- THE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES
IN THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; AND
- THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ONGOING COVERT OPERA-
TIONS AND SENSITIVE COLLECTION MISSIONS. *momentum*

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AFFAIRS, NOW GENERAL SCOWCROFT, HAS STAFF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE REVIEWS. HE IS TO CONSULT
HEADS OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WHICH USE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE, IN OTHER WORDS, THE CONSUMER COMMUNITY.

MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCE CONTROL

A PIVOTAL BODY IN THE NEW SETUP IS THE THREE-MAN
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, WITH RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCE CONTROL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. (CHART) CONTROL OF RESOURCES, YOU RECALL, CHART
3
HAS BEEN A MATTER OF CONTENTION FOR YEARS. THE CFI RE-
PORTS DIRECTLY TO THE NSC. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE CHAIRS IT, OTHER MEMBERS ARE THE DEPUTY SECRE-
TARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, ROBERT ELLSWORTH,
REPRESENTING THE DEPARTMENT THAT CONTROLS THE BULK OF
THE RESOURCES, AND THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WILLIAM HYLAND, FOR POLICY
INPUT.

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THE CFI'S SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS ARE:

- CONTROLLING BUDGET PREPARATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (THAT IS, EXCLUDING TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE),
- ESTABLISHING MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR THAT PROGRAM, AND
- CARRYING OUT NSC POLICY DECISIONS, ESPECIALLY ON COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION.

IN CASE OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOT UNKNOWN ON SUCH MATTERS, THE DCI OR ANY MEMBER OF THE NSC MAY APPEAL TO THE NSC. SO FAR THIS CFI HAS BEEN AN ~~EXTREMELY ACTIVE BODY~~ ^{EX}, MEETING ABOUT ONCE A WEEK.

ILLEGIB

ONE INNOVATION REFLECTS A GROWING RECOGNITION THAT THE DCI'S RESPONSIBILITIES FALL INTO TWO MAIN SLOTS -- ONE, ADMINISTERING CIA; THE OTHER, LEADING THE COMMUNITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE DIRECTOR NOW HAS TWO PRINCIPAL DEPUTIES, ONE FOR EACH OF THOSE FUNCTIONS. THE MAN FOR THE COMMUNITY IS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AND DESIGNATED FOR THE AGENCY SPOT IS HENRY KNOCHE, A VETERAN CIA OFFICER FROM THE ANALYTICAL SIDE OF THE HOUSE. PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD FOR CONGRESS TO WRITE THIS CHANGE INTO THE STATUTES, INCIDENTALLY.

UNDER HIS RESTATED AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH NECESSARY BOARDS AND COMMITTEES, THE DCI ON MAY 6 FORMALLY ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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(NFIB) AS A REPLACEMENT FOR USIB. WITHOUT DETAILING ITS FULL LIST OF FUNCTIONS, I'D JUST CALL ATTENTION TO A COUPLE OF ADDITIONS. THESE ARE (1) TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS AND IDENTIFY CONSUMER NEEDS FOR INTELLIGENCE; AND (2) TO DEVELOP POLICIES REGARDING ARRANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS -- AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SUBJECT.

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD, AS SHOWN ON THIS CHART, IS THE SAME AS THE OLD USIB, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE DCI'S DEPUTY FOR THE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN ADDED, AS THE VICE CHAIRMAN. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE DCI'S DEPUTY FOR ADMINISTERING CIA ALSO IS A MEMBER, TO VOTE CIA'S STOCK, SO TO SPEAK; AND THAT THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE REMAIN AS OBSERVERS -- AND FAR FROM SILENT OBSERVERS I MIGHT ADD.

CHART
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DEFENSE REALIGNMENT

SPEAKING OF THE SERVICES, THIS IS PROBABLY THE PLACE TO TAKE NOTE OF REALIGNMENTS THAT SECRETARY RUMSFELD ANNOUNCED ON 14 MAY FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

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LET ME SUMMARIZE WHAT WAS DONE.

FIRST, A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED. HE WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO DEPUTY SECRETARY ELLSWORTH IN REGARD TO THE LEGALITY AND PROPRIETY OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, AND WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S NEW INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD. I WILL DISCUSS THIS GROUP LATER.

SECOND, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE) IS DESIGNATED AS DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE, OR DDI. AS SUCH, HE WILL EXERCISE BOTH STAFF AND LINE AUTHORITY ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OVER DoD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS STEP IS IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL BACK IN 1970, AS WELL AS IN LINE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER. THE DIRECTORS OF BOTH NSA AND DIA REPORT TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD THROUGH THE DDI. THE DIRECTOR OF DIA, FURTHERMORE SERVES AS ONE OF THE DDI'S DEPUTIES, BUT ALSO REPORTS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN REGARD TO THE SERVICES' SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

THIRD, DIA HAS BEEN STREAMLINED SO THAT ONLY TWO VICE DIRECTORS -- ONE FOR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION, AND

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ONE FOR PLANS, OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT -- REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, GENERAL SAM WILSON, INSTEAD OF THE TWELVE ELEMENTS THAT DID BEFORE. THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, INCIDENTALLY, CONTINUE TO BE COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE, BUT ARE NOT OTHERWISE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THIS RE-ORGANIZATION.

FOURTH, AND LAST, A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONSISTING OF SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON A TRIAL BASIS. THE BOARD'S PURPOSE IS TO IMPROVE THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT QUALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS THROUGH MORE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL USERS.

OVERSIGHT

NOW, A FEW WORDS ABOUT OVERSIGHT, AND THEN A LOOK INTO THE CLOUDY CRYSTAL BALL. THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD THAT I MENTIONED BEFORE GETS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST THE PRESIDENT, THE NSC, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN SEEING THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOLLOWS THE VARIOUS NEW RESTRICTIONS. (CHART)

CHART

5

THE THREE MEMBERS OF THE OVERSIGHT BOARD ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE LONG-STANDING PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB); THEY ARE

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VETERAN DIPLOMAT ROBERT MURPHY, ECONOMIST LEO CHERNE,
AND ROBERT AILES, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

COVERT ACTION AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS

WHAT ABOUT COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE NEW ERA?

THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVISE
THE PRESIDENT IN THIS AREA TO THE OPERATIONS ADVISORY
GROUP, SUCCEEDING THE OLD "40 COMMITTEE," AND UPGRADED.

(CHART)

CHART
6

IN BRIEF, THE OAG IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT ON ALL PROPOSALS
FOR COVERT ACTION AND CERTAIN SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION MISSIONS, AND SUBMITTING TO THE NSC A
PERIODIC REVIEW OF SUCH ONGOING OPERATIONS AND
COLLECTION MISSIONS.

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FUTURE CHANGES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

NOTWITHSTANDING ALL THESE CHANGES, CONGRESS BELIEVES THAT THE DCI'S RESPONSIBILITY OVER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE ENHANCED, AND SPELLED OUT CLEARLY AND IN DETAIL IN STATUTE. AS YOU WILL SEE, MOST OF THEIR IDEAS FIT WITH ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN, BUT ACCORDING TO CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE DEFINING THESE RESPONSIBILITIES ALONE, AS IT HAS DONE SINCE 1947. IN SUMMARY, HERE ARE A FEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL SELECT COMMITTEES HAVE MADE THAT WILL CHANGE THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:

-- BY STATUTE, THE DCI WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISER, WITH EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE DCI WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO ESTABLISH A STAFF DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO HIM TO HELP PREPARE HIS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS AND TO COORDINATE THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AS A GROUP OF 11 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS DO NOW. THE DCI WOULD ALSO BE EM-

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POWERED TO DRAW ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS NEEDED TO HELP HIM DO THIS.

-- BY STATUTE, THE DCI WOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR ESTABLISHING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS, PREPARING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET, AND PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM OPERATIONS.

THE DCI WOULD BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW ALL FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS, INCLUDING TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WHICH IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES. AND TO SETTLE ANOTHER POINT OF CONTENTION, THE STATUTE WOULD MANDATE STEPS TO INSURE THAT IN TIME OF WAR THE RELEVANT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE DCI BE LIMITED TO TEN YEARS IN OFFICE, AND THAT HE BE SEPARATED FROM DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OVER THE CIA.

THESE ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE CHANGES BEING SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. THE LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR INDICATES THEY WILL NOT BE ENACTED INTO LAW UNTIL 1977, SO WE CAN EXPECT MANY REFINEMENTS BY THEN.

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CONCLUSION

I CLOSE WITH TWO OBSERVATIONS.

FIRST, HOWEVER EXTENSIVE THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE PAST, PRESENT, OR FUTURE IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY, WE HAVE SEEN IN RECENT YEARS THAT INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM. AND SO I WOULD LIKE TO CITE ONE OF MR. BUSH'S INJUNCTIONS TO THE REORGANIZED COMMUNITY. HE CALLED FOR CONTINUING ATTENTION TO IMPROVING PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF US INTELLIGENCE. WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, HE SAID, THE COMMUNITY SHOULD STRIVE TO BETTER PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MISSION AND OF OUR PRODUCT.

SECOND, I ECHO MR. BUSH'S TRIBUTE TO THE DEDICATED MEN AND WOMEN WHO STAFF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY. AS HAS OFTEN BEEN POINTED OUT, OUR FAILURES GET WIDE PUBLICITY, AND OUR SUCCESSES FREQUENTLY GO UNHERALDED. I ONLY HOPE THAT, WHATEVER CHANGES IN THE COMMUNITY ARE IN FACT FINALLY MADE, THEY WILL STILL PERMIT THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS TO SERVE THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AS WELL AS, OR PREFERABLY BETTER THAN, THEY HAVE IN THE 29 YEARS SINCE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WAS CREATED.

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